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SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? By LEWIs
MAYERS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. Pp. x, 341. $6.50.
Nathaniel L. Nathanson j
Professor Mayers' thorough and realistic examination of the privilege
against self-incrimination, both in historical and present practice, concerns
itself primarily with the privilege's effect upon the administration of criminal
justice. Has it justified the sentimental attachment which some eminent
judges and scholars have expressed for it? In general, Mr. Mayers' answer
is a resounding "No." He believes that the privilege has contributed little,
if anything, to the protection of the innocent and much to the escape of the
guilty, and that it even handicaps the vindication of the innocent. Neither
can he find much substance in the more ethereal claims for its service in
defense of the dignity of man and the fundamental ideals of a free society.
Mr. Mayers examines the operation of the privilege in the various
stages of proceedings in which it may appear-before the grand jury, in
the hands of the police, before the committing magistrate, at the trial itself,
criminal or civil, in legislative inquiries, and so on. He is really not much
concerned with its invocation either by the defendant in a criminal trial
or by the witness at legislative inquiries. With respect to the latter, he
very wisely points out that the use of the privilege has had little effect in
seriously handicapping a congressional committee in the pursuit of legiti-
mate functions-the examination of the need for legislation. With respect
to the former, he believes that an innocent defendant will almost always
take the stand and that the defendant who does not do so is seriously
prejudiced, no matter what the rule with respect to comment or considera-
tion may be. Thus it is the effect of the privilege in the various types of
preliminary inquiry which Mr. Mayers regards as the crucial question.
This crucial area does not include questioning by the police. Here
Mr. Mayers quite correctly says the privilege is technically irrelevant, for
even without it the police have no authority to compel answers. But it is
not so easily stated that, were it not for the privilege, the police might not
be given such authority. It also seems likely that popular belief in the
privilege as a basis for refusing to answer police inquiries has some effect in
encouraging such resistance. However that may be, Mr. Mayers is not
arguing for an increased scope for police questioning; indeed, he is in favor
of surrounding such questioning with more effective safeguards against
third degree methods, bullying and inaccurate versions of reported con-
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fessions. These include mechanical recordings, more intensive examina-
tion by the committing magistrate into the circumstances of every con-
fession, and separation of functions so as to vest in an agency--quite
independent of the police--the responsibility for booking, custody and
supervision of interrogation. In this connection Mr. Mayers considers
but does not espouse the suggestion made by others that any interrogation
which is to be the basis of a confession should be before the committing
magistrate. He apparently accepts the position of most police adminis-
trators that the opportunity for questioning under conditions of privacy is
essential to securing a confession in most cases and that many crimes can be
solved only by use of this technique.
The discussion of police questioning is a detour from the main path.
The principal attack is directed against the use of the privilege in grand
jury or similar proceedings. This is where Mr. Mayers believes it has
acted most effectively as an obstruction to the enforcement of criminal
justice and where it has the least justification as a protection of the in-
nocent. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that it may frequently impede
the vindication of the innocent because it is the guilty who usually will use it
to protect themselves at the expense of others. Mr. Mayers does recognize
that even before the grand jury there is danger of abuse of the power of
compulsory interrogation, such as browbeating, bullying, and confusing by
an aggressive and perhaps unscrupulous prosecutor. This he would guard
against by giving grand jury witnesses the assistance of counsel "when the
witness is or becomes aware that he is so implicated in the matter under
investigation that suspicion of his own possible criminality is or may be
involved." (p. 58). In order to insure that this would be more than a
theoretical right, he would impose an obligation upon the state to provide
counsel to the indigent at this stage of the proceeding. One might say that
a minor theme running through the whole of Mr. Mayers' approach to the
administration of criminal justice is to substitute an effective right to counsel
for the privilege against self-incrimination.
But even assuming that the privilege could be withdrawn at the grand
jury level, what use may be made of confessions or other damaging ad-
missions elicited during such proceedings? Mr. Mayers is personally quite
willing to see them admitted in the criminal trial itself. But recognizing
that this is too much to hope for in the foreseeable future, he is ready to
settle for a "middle course"-a qualified immunity which prohibits the use
of the grand jury testimony at the criminal trial. This has been the law in
Canada since the Evidence Act of 1892 and it has not resulted in shocking
the conscience of bench or bar.
This brings us to the real villain of Mr. Mayers' piece-the United
States Supreme Court and particularly its decision in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,' holding that such a qualified privilege as exists in Canada is not
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional guaranty. This decision, Mr. Mayers
'142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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argues, had no justification in constitutional language or history, rested
on a confusion of the witness's common-law privilege with the defendant's
constitutional privilege, and reversed the trend of constitutional adjudica-
tion with respect to the privilege in the states. Narrowly interpreted, the
basis of the decision might have been only that a grand jury proceeding
was a criminal case within the meaning of the fifth amendment, but in
subsequent development this particular aspect became irrelevant. The case
came to stand for the broader principle that no witness in any type of
proceeding can be compelled to give answers which may tend to implicate
him in criminal activity. In the language of Counselnan itself: "The
object was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as
a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show
that he himself had committed a crime." 2 In the language of Mr. Mayers:
"Seldom in our constitutional history has so grave an issue been so sum-
marily disposed of." (p. 209).
Apart from the plea for wholesale reconsideration of Counselman, the
significant questions of public policy posed by Mr. Mayers are whether other
qualifications upon the operation of the privilege-such as that anyone who
accepts public office thereby surrenders the privilege with respect to au-
thorized inquiry into the conduct of his office-should not be encouraged.
Statutory or administrative provisions making invocation of the privilege
with respect to official conduct a basis for immediate termination of public
employment have now become quite common. Mr. Mayers considers this
inadequate because by forfeiting the job the wrongdoer may escape criminal
prosecution; he therefore advocates expansion of the condition so as to
require waiver of the privilege as a condition of assuming public office.
Indeed, he would expand this approach to positions of private trust as well
-the guardian in relation to his ward, the corporate director or officer in
relation to stockholders, the labor union official in relation to the union,
the lawyer and his client, and so on. Finally, it is suggested that the prin-
ciple might be applied to any licensed profession or occupation and to any
transaction requiring government permission, by analogy to the public
records doctrine making the privilege inapplicable to records, required by
law to be kept. Mr. Mayers seems carried away with the promising vistas
opened up by this approach. As he says in summing it up:
"Were the privilege against self-incrimination completely withdrawn,
as here urged, from every person occupying a position of trust, public
or private, when interrogated as a witness regarding the discharge
of his trust, and from every person engaged in a licensed calling or
operating a licensed enterprise or establishment, or performing a
public contract, when questioned as a witness regarding anything done
under his license or in connection with his license or contract, the
privilege of the witness would lose much of its present-day practical
2 Id. at 562.
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importance. In this direction, it is believed, lies the best immediate
hope for undoing the mischief which the far too generous expansion of
the privilege by the courts has worked." (pp. 155-56).
Mr. Mayers recognizes that any hope for acceptance of this solution
must rest on acceptance of his fundamental analysis of the privilege itself-
that it is largely an historical anomaly which has spread like a noxious
weed through the fair garden of our jurisprudence. Thus he undertakes
to answer those who, like Dean Griswold, have found in it at least some
echo of the fundamental values of our civilization-"an ever-present re-
minder of our belief in the importance of the individual, a symbol of our
highest aspirations." a In brief, he finds that such high-sounding general-
izations have little appeal when viewed in the light of the nauseating or
petty circumstances in which the privilege is often invoked-the narcotics
smuggler covering his tracks, the labor racketeer refusing to account to his
union, the importer refusing to produce the invoices which will determine
the value of his goods. But this rebuttal equates the exercise of the privilege
with the crime which it may make more difficult to prosecute or with the
criminal who may thus escape punishment. The same evaluation might be
made with respect to any of the other constitutional guaranties which impede
and sometimes frustrate effective prosecution. If their value is measured
by the evil characters who appeal to them or by the crimes which they
sometimes allow to go unpunished, they are all unpretty things.
A pragmatic approach, however, will take account of both the good
and the bad which the privilege accomplishes and ask whether, on balance,
it does indeed serve the higher values of our society. This is what Mr.
Mayers is asking us to do and we should not shrink from the assessment
simply because the privilege once served our intellectual forefathers in
opposing religious or political persecution or because it is enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. Presumably even the Bill of Rights will gain in strength
only from openminded re-examination of its weaknesses. But as Dean
Griswold has more than once remarked, it is at least an interesting coin-
cidence that the privilege should have first achieved prominence in pro-
tecting freedom of dissent and should have again become the subject of
modern controversy primarily in the area of belief and association.4 It is
doubtless true, as Mr. Mayers suggests, that in its operation before legis-
lative committees the privilege has not interfered with any legitimate or at
least significant purposes of legislative investigation. However, it is not
so clear that the privilege has not afforded significant protection to in-
dividuals in enabling them to withstand or cut off inquiry into their political
associations. To some extent even here the privilege has not been a wholly
satisfactory defense: its very invocation is something of a humiliation
3 GPiswoLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 81 (1955).
4 See id. at 8-9; Address by Dean Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, North-
western University, May 13, 1960.
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which' no amount of rationalization on a philosophical level can entirely
dispel. Neither has there been any really effective protection against
indirect sanctions, such as loss of employment as a result of pleading the
privilege. It may be that there should be other ways of protecting against
the abuse of the legislature's investigatory power-that freedom of speech
and association or the inherent limits of legislative power would be more
appropriate legal barriers. But the fact of the matter is that such alternate
protection has not been available; the law does not always develop in such
neat categories that the punishment fits the crime or that the protection
exactly fits the abuse of power. Unless one is prepared to be as much a
martyr as Dr. Uphaus,5 one must either cooperate with an investigation as
ridiculous and obnoxious as that case illustrates or else fall back upon the
privilege itself. It should also be noted that it is what Mr. Mayers calls the
privilege of the witness, rather than the privilege of the criminal defendant,
which is applicable in such investigations. Consequently, unless the prin-
ciple of Counselman v. Hitchcock is accepted in its full sweep-an accept-
ance to which Mr. Mayers so strenuously objects-there would be no
constitutional protection at all in this area. Conceivably some respect might
be paid to the privilege even in legislative investigations, simply as a com-
mon-law rule of evidence. In England, where some common-law rules are
treated as practically equivalent to fundamental principles of the unwritten
constitution, this might work very well. But can anyone seriously doubt
that, in the United States, the acceptance of this view would make the
privilege, for all practical purposes, inapplicable to legislative investigations?
This brings us back to consideration of Mr. Mayers' middle course,
the Canadian solution, which treats only the use of the witness's incriminat-
ing statements themselves in a criminal prosecution as a breach of the
privilege. It would be interesting to know whether, in actual practice,
there is any substantial difference between the American and the Canadian
systems. It is rather difficult to believe that a promise of immunity in fact
so qualified, or at least so understood by the beneficiary, would be effective
in obtaining valuable information which would not otherwise be forth-
coming. Of course, when the immunity is constitutionally sufficient, the
compulsion to testify is legally operative. But if the chances are good that
the legal compulsion to release the information sought can be evaded by
perjury, it would seem that the theoretical bargain of information for
qualified immunity would have to be sweetened by informal promises of
complete immunity in order to extract truthful cooperation. And con-
versely, where the chances of proving perjury are high, it would follow that
the evidence obtained is not likely to be crucial to successful prosecution.
Consequently, to one admittedly inexpert in the intricacies of criminal law
enforcement, it seems at least doubtful that there is really as significant a
difference between Canadian and American treatment of the privilege as
Mr. Mayers assumes. Nor do I find that he has grappled directly with this
5 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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question or collected any data which might contribute to a more informed
judgment.
More promising and less objectionable qualifications upon the exer-
cise of the privilege seem to be opened up by the Shapiro principle of
required records,6 which, applied with judicious restraint, is less offensive
to the values protected by the privilege. For example, even if the Shapiro
doctrine were carried to the extent mentioned with apprehension by the
dissenters-to the financial records underlying our tax returns--it is
doubtful that many of us would be shocked or feel our privacy intolerably
invaded upon finding that the records must be produced if our returns are
seriously questioned. 7 Indeed, most people probably operate upon the
assumption that this is already the law. So too the principle may doubtless
be extended to various types of public or even private trust, so as to impose
a heavy burden of disclosure with respect to information relevant to the
trust upon all those who accept fiduciary responsibilities. This is not an
invitation to carry the requirements to unnecessary and abusive lengths, and
the reasonableness of the requirements would always remain open to chal-
lenge not only upon policy but also upon due process grounds. Taking
into account this possibility of extension of Shapiro-as well as, on the one
hand, the possibility of greater judicial restraint upon frivolous uses of the
privilege and, on the other, the larger purposes which the privilege still
serves-it does not seem that Mr. Mayers, despite the breadth and depth of
his analysis, has made a convincing case for significant amendment of the
privilege itself.
6 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
7 See Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act and The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHE. L. REv. 687, 715-19 (1951).
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